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The principles upon which redress is based in the action of
trespass are, like all common-law principles for the greater
part, the product of historical development. This is more uni-
versally true of trespass than of any other form of action
because of its wider significance, and because it occupies prob-
ably two-thirds of the attention of the modern court. It needs
no proof to demonstrate that economic and social change are
the controlling factors in the evolution of trespass, and not
judicial or philosophical fiat. For example, some years ago
a person riding upon the front platform of a street car was not
-considered to be the agent of his own injury if hurt by mis-
adventure. But suddenly the eyes of the community are
awakened to the possibilities of electricity as a motive power,
and all street cars are now operated by means of electricity.
Straightway the law of trespass responds, and to jurisprudence
is added a new principle, namely, that one who stands on the
platform of an electric car, when he could have gone inside,
has assumed a certain risk, and, if injured, must shoulder the
responsibility himself.' As this process of adding principle to
principle through some fourteen centuries has resulted in.that
enormous mass of decisions which, added together, constitute
the law of trespass, what, if any, theory has been the law of
its development? From the year 1285 A. D. onward, the history
of trespass is an open book in this sense, that the decisions are
there available to anyone who chooses to read. From that date
the judges administer relief in trespass and in all its allied
actions very much as if they had inherited from their forbears
certain views or principles of which the relief granted was a
necessary corollary. There is, however, no suggestion of any
underlying theory unless the general maxim of the common
law that no wrong shall be without a remedy can be called a
theory. It must be observed in parenthesis that acceptance of
the historical method of inquiry precludes a belief in any theory,
if anything static be involved in the word theory; for a case
decided upon oue theory to-day may be decided upon another
in the course of a few years or even a few months.
'Thane v. Scranton Traction Co. (i8g9) 19z Pa. 249.
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The law of trespass chronologically, like that of contract-
like that of the entire common law-falls into three distinct
periods. The period of no reports, from 566 A. D. to 1194
A. D.; the period of the records, to 1285 A. D.; and the
period of the common-law reports from that time to the-present.
There may be common-law reports prior to 1285 A. D., for
there are many unpublished Year Book manuscripts of the
reign of Edward I, but the date 1285 A. D. is chosen arbitrarily
as marking the beginning of that peculiar development of tres-
pass which is based upon indirect injury. Although but few
reported cases exist as late as the year 1387 A. D.,.the law of neg-
ligence had in that short time progressed so far that in an action
of damages for failure to repair a hedge, there is laid a duty, a
breach of the duty, and resulting damage.
2 Thus early, therefore,
the basis of redress in trespass on the case, the fundamental
principle of universal recognition from that to the present, was
established. As the Statute of Westminster II, as interpreted,
led inevitably to this decision, and as that statute was intro-
duced to supply a recognized defect in the common law at the
time of its passage, the date chosen is not without significance.
It is obvious that a remedy already existed for all tangible
injuries or trespasses, or rather, for such injuries as were
produced by direct causes, and had not to be followed through
a chain of causation. It is the purpose of this essay to trace
the development of the action of trespass prior to the Statute
of Westminster II, and to discover the principles upon which
redress was based.
The action of trespass from its origin has been intended to
provide a remedy for an" injury to property or to the person.
In modern terminology it is an action for damages. Was it
always so? The damages constitute the remedy. But the
trespass in the eaTly law was very frequently the taking of
property. Toward what end was the action directed when the
injury was an assault?
It will appear in the course of this discussion that the action
of trespass existed for the purpose of affording a remedy, and
that if damages were sought, or even were involved, they were
usually granted. It will appear also, that the action was not
crimi4al in nature, except for the fiction by which the king
justified his interference, that the defendant had been guilty
of a breach of the king's peace.
In the Saxon period it is hopeless to seek for a distinct law
.of trespass. And, considered as a judicial system, the Saxon





Dooms present a colorless picture indeed. Some pretense might
be made to evolve from those general miscellaneous provisions
a law as to sales, as to warranties, or even as to the collection
of debts, but no form of action can be discovered to which the
name trespass could be applied.
But if it should be assumed that the Saxon laws afford no
evidence that bears upon the subsequent history of trespass,
nothing could be wider from the mark. The defect to be
observed in those laws is not lack of instances in which tres-
passes, typical of the tortious wrongs of our own day, may be
redressed, but of any legal conception or form of action capable
of assimilating a large number of instances, by means of which
uniform legal development might have been possible. It is
probable that the want of a jury had much to do with the
incoherence of the Saxon law. Each provision of the Dooms
contained a fixed penalty for an individual act. Classes of acts
had no existence; classes of wrongs had no existence. For
example, the laws of Aethelbirht exacted the sum of fifty scaetts
from the man who pulled his neighbor's hair.8 And if a man
passed over a fence, he was obliged to pay four shillings.'
There is no need of multiplying instances of this sort, for the
Dooms are filled with them. The moral is plain; There being
nobody charged with finding facts and assessing damages, the
law of necessity fixed the damages beforehand, with a few
exceptions. There were occasions, however, on which the law-
giver must have felt the need in certain cases of leaving some
portion of the damages or compensation to be determined by
unprejudiced third persons. And a few provisions of the Saxon
Dooms justify this conclusion. The law had no difficulty in
fixing the amount to be paid if a defendant broke the plaintiff's
thigh.- With its customary directness the Saxon law said, if a
thigh be broken, let bMt be made with twelve shillings. But
it was obliged to consider also that a broken thigh might leave
the plaintiff lame.- In that case, said the law, the friends must
arbitrate.5 So, too, in the case of injuries the extent of which
must be left to the imagination, the amount of compensation
was necessarily left indefinite, because it could not be ascertained
beforehand.
'B. Thorpe, Editor, Ancient Laws and Institutes of England, etc. (I94o)
13. 1 Felix Liebermann, Gesetze der Angelsachsen (i9o3) s. A scaett
is 1/250 of a pound of silver, i Rogers Ruding, Annals of Coinage (1840)
296.
' Thorpe, op. cit. ii.
'Thorpe, op. cit. ig. Liebermann, op. cit. 7.
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"If anyone injure another man's vineyard, or his fields
or aught of his lands, let him make b~t as it may be
valued."8
There is nothing to indicate how the inquiry is to be conducted,
but the instances quoted leave no doubt that there was some
method of fixing damages other than the foresight of' the
legislator.
7
The assessment of damages plays a great part in the develop-
ment of the action of trespass. And as the jury later became
the machinery by which this task was performed, we may ascribe
no little influence in the history of the forms of action to this
source. The Saxon Dooms would not have contained separate
provisions for a broken thigh, for pulling hair, and many like
offences, had it been possible to leave the extent of the damage
and the amount to be paid, to the jury. Without the jury, there
might have been no common law, and we might be drinking our
legal lore from Roman goblets. This is pure assumption,
however, for it can never be known how much common law
passed over at the time of the Conquest and by tradition gradu-
ally worked its way into legal principle. This is all that can
be said of damages in the Saxon law. Of the punishment of
offences that might be considered trespasses there is no lack,
and they include wrongs of almost every type of trespass known.
Let it be understood that they are miscellaneous provisions
aimed not at a class of cases but at .the particular event. The
law was not aimed at wrongs of force in general but at the
breaking of an arm by the defendant or the breaking of a fence
by cattle.
The reign of Henry II may be regarded as a cauldron into
which was poured an unassorted mass of litigation to be fused
and alloyed and refined, and by various processes molded into
a coherent form. The molds as we know were furnished by
Henry II-the jury-the writs-the invitation to suitors, rich
and poor alike, to seek justice in the king's court. And in
1194 A. D. begin the records, and with them, the principle
of stare decisis.8
It remains to discover what was contained in that
body of law upon which the processes of the common law
were to work. Of such trespasses as result from the direct
application of forces, little need be said. The Saxon Dooms are
built upon force. More than one-half of the law consists of
'Thorpe, op. cit. 54. Liebermann, op. cit. 37.
See 2 Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, 523.
'See Jenks, Short Hist. Eng. Law, 24.
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an enumeration of deeds of violence for which compensation
must be made, or for which the king imposes a penalty. At
times, as in the case of the broken thigh, the remedy is far-
reaching and extends to injuries that may develop later. So
too, the bot is twelve shillings if an ear be cut off,9 twenty-five
shillings if, as a consequence, the other ear becomes deaf.10
Although trespass is termed a noxal action, involving some-
thing in the nature of a crime, the inception of the action, or
rather the first attempts to give compensation for harm due to
wrongful acts, suggest nothing that is criminal. The inevitable
result of the litigation is the payment of money. It is not until
the time of King Alfred that the resounding phrases of the book
of Exodus fill the laws with retribution and physical penalties.11
The Saxon law was not indifferent to the intention with which an
act was done, nor to the element of malice, if present. One who
furnishes weapons to those in strife must pay six shillings though
no one be injured.12  Again, if the owner of an ox know of
any viciousness in his beast and neglect to confine it, he must
give another ox if his own gore that of his neighbor, whereas
if he be ignorant of any evil traits in the animal, the penalty is
less.13
There are many provisions in the Saxon laws of a similar
nature that suggest tests of liability, and some that border on
negligence. And if a modern terminology may be applied to
a legal system that had no distinctive forms of action,
contributory negligence was at times an answer to a claim for
compensation.
A churl's close ought to be fenced, winter and summer; if
it be unfenced, and his neighbor's cattle stray in through his
own gap, he shall have nothing from the cattle-let him drive
it out and bear the damage."4 If, however, there be a beast
that breaks hedges and goes in everywhere and he who owns
it cannot or will not restrain it, he forfeits all of the animal
except the skin. 5 And if a man find swine among his mast,
he is entitled to six shillings. But if they have been there only
once the owner need only pay a shilling if he can prove that
they came not there oftener."8 Yet why the distinction between
straying cattle and straying swine? The penalty for carelessness
'Thorpe, op. cit. 15, par. 39. Liebermann, op. cit. 5, par. 4o.
" Thorpe, op. cit. 15, par. 4o. Liebermann, op. cit. 5, par. 39.
'Thorpe, op. cit.; Liebermann, op. cit., Laws of Alfred.
"Thorpe, op. cit. 7. Liebermann, op. cit. 4.
Thorpe, op. cit. 35. Liebermann, op. cit. 35.
"Thorpe, op. cit. 127.
Thorpe, op. cit. 129.
'Thorpe, op. cit. 133.
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in carrying a spear might contain a suggestion of negligence,
if there were any indication of uniformity in the application
of the law. The tests of liability appear sporadically and not
as part of any coherent legal consciousness.1
7 Yet tests must
have been applied. In the case of, the spear the test appears
in the law; if the butt is higher than the point, the penalty is
so much; if the butt and the point are on the same level, there
is no fault. Furthermore, some test must be applied to determine
whether or not a man knows of vice in his beasts. But when
this is said, all is said. The law progressed, no doubt; for the
first reported cases disclose an almost inconceivable advance
over this haphazard way of setting litigation. Yet it is clear
that the Saxon Dooms show little attempt if. any tc develop the
form of action that later became trespass. This, briefly, is what
Henry II put into his cauldron, and into his molds. Perhaps
we should add also a suggestion of disseisin-the Saxon real-
lac,'8 and the suggestion of slander in the penalty for calling
a man perjurer in the dw.elling of anotber.'
9 What came of the
process?
The first cases reported reveal three civil actions of tort of
which one, trespass, in time absorbed the other two. They were
the assize of novel disseisin, the assize of nuisance, and the
action of trespass, or trangressio. All three in form contained
words suggestive of violence, and all three were done contra
pacem-against the king's .peace. The words "with force and
arms" had little significance, nor had the words injuste detinet
any greater meaning, for a defendant sometimes denies the
force and arms in debt upon an obligation. In disseisin the
defendant injuste disseisavit, or injuste et sine judicio disseisavit,
in the assize of nuisance the defendants injuste et sine Judicio
levaverunt quendam murum, in debt, the defendant injuste
detinet.
Thus, in the reign of Henry II, the action of trespass, the
whole common law, has become dynamic, for the reports of
the following reign reveal three different forms of action, all
of which might properly be designated trespasses; and if we
regard the volume of cases in the plea rolls, there is no dearth
of litigants. One characteristic of Saxon relief has remained,
however, and is destined to remain in the common law for some
centuries. That is the penalty that accompanies litigation. In
the Saxon Dooms, the defendant paid six shillings to the plaintiff
and twelve shillings to the king. In the common law, the
"TThorpe, op. cit. 85. Liebermann, op. cit. 69.
1 Thorpe, op. cit. iog.
"Thorpe, op. cit. 54. Liebermann, op. cit. 35.
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amercement is the almost inevitable result of a, lawsuit. What-
ever the relief administered, there is always some point in the
case where one party or the other is prepared for an amerce-
medt or penalty. It is administered with fine impartiality and
with no reference to the form of action. The plaintiff is amerced
pro falso clamore in disseisin,20 pro injusta deforc 'in assisa
ultime presentac' (unjust deforcement in darrein presentment)2'
and pro injusta detentione in a plea of debt.2 2 No action is
more or less penal, more or less noxal, because of the amerce-
ment. It is to be regarded more as a perquisite or profit of
litigation than 'as an index of the degree to which the action
was penal in its nature. Judged by this standard, debt and
darrein presentment are as highly penal as trespass.
Thus, if we have no preliminary fundamental distinctions for
the earliest forms of trespass, we have at least one characteristic
common to all. It is not to be supposed that any one form of
action had a power of assimilation that made it superior to the
others. Distinctions were early formulated by which one action
was made the vehicle for certain linds of relief; for example,
the matter of the right to real estate must be tried in the assize
of novel disseisin; but the connotations of the three forms of
trespass were not so clearly cut, that an authority as to the same
kind of wrong might not be found in both the assize of nuisance
and in trespass.
The notion that has somehow become inseparably connected
with trespass is that it provided relief against deeds of violence,
and therefore was accompanied by a suggestion of something
unusually drastic in its administration of relief. This is founded
upon a conception fundamentally wrong. The first litigation
involving injuries due to violence was not pursued as a sub-
stitute for criminal processes. In the Saxon law, in the earliest
tines at least, there is very little suggestion of violence in the
penalties. Even homicide is a thing to be paid for. It is not
until the reign of King Alfred that the doctrine of an eye
for an eye and a tooth for a tooth becomes a part of the law.
The result of all litigation, as we have seen, was a money penalty.
What, then, differentiated trespass from debt or contract? Was
it that the courts afforded a civil remedy for a crime which
could be enforced by imprisonment if necessary? This is
absurd, because as we know, imprisonment for debt has only
been abolished within a century. The theories that are spun
about the action of trespass are children of a later growth
" Tempore Johannis, Placitorum Abbreviatio, 8r.
'M. 25 Hen. III, Placitorum Abbreviatio, iio.
M . 25 Hen. III, .Placitoram Abbreviatio, iio.
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and represent usually the jurist's attempt to satisfy his mind
as to the reason upon which his decision is based. His real
reason for the decision is to be found in history, and he decides
in accordance with history even when he overrules a precedent.
The trespasses for which the first common-law writs were
issued consisted of two that were aimed at specific offences gen-
erally connected with real estate. The third, trespass, was given
from the first a connotation wide enough to have embraced
both of the others, had there been any speculation as to legal
remedies to open the eyes of judges and lawyers to that fact.
The action of novel disseisin was aimed at the forcible dis-
possession of a man from his freehold. It was a complete and
thorough remedy; it restored the property of the owner, and
awarded him damages for the detention, and the defendant paid
a fine as well.
23
The assize early became the containing vessel for a fairly
wide group of wrongs, and as litigation in the assize -was fre-
quent, it early developed principles and displayed a remarkable
power of assimilation and sturdy growth that resisted until
within the last few centuries the encroachment of trespass.
Originally aimed at dispossession, it soon became a medium for
trying title, and usurped to that extent the office of the writ
of right. If we read Lilly's reports and his learned introduc-
tion we might possibly share his regret at the disuse of an
action that admitted of so few delays, that afforded such prompt
justice, and so efficient a remedy. So far as the decisions prior
to the reign of Edward I are concerned, they disclose com-
paratively small variation in principle, but if the content of
novel disseisin is known, we can more easily understand why
the courts refused a remedy in trespass and referred it to novel
disseisin. The application of the remedy was regulated in
accordance with certain well-defined rules of inclusion and
exclusion. It was a defense for the defendant to say that the
plaintiff is his villein,2 ' and apparently it is an equally good
defense that the plaintiff is a bastard.25 The writ did not lie
between brother and sister.28 Nor did it apply to lands held
in ancient demesne.27  The names of both parties are to be set
forth in the writ.28 And the land and the quantity of land must
" P. 7 and 8, John, Placitorum Abbreviatio, 5o; Tempore Johannis,
Ibid., 76; M. 25 Hen. III, Ibid., 115.
"Tempore Regis Ricardi Primi, Placitorua Abbreviatio, xi.
'28 Hen. III, Placitorum Abbreviatio.
H" 4 John, Placitorum Abbreviatio, 38.
'25 Hen. III, Placitorum Abbreviatio, 117.
'*M. 34 Edward I, Placitorum Abbreviatio, 259.
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be made certain before the assize is taken. 29  It is not at all
characteristic of the action of novel disseisin, that the action
must be brought in the county in which the land is, for that
objection apparently could be made in almost any common-law
action. 0 The assize includes actions for a variety of wrongs
which, however, are uniform in principle. For example, the
assize might be maintained for common of wood,3 1 for a com-
mon of piscary,22 for common of pasture.P3 Finally, as a
matter of practice, let us note that the plaintiff is liable to be
fined if he claims a freehold when he has only a right of
common.3 4
Evidently the basic principle of the relief in novel disseisin
is that no one shall unjustly and without the judgment of a
court deprive another of his property, but within the sphere
of the action the remedy was complete and effective. It was
understood that merely restoring his property to the plaintiff
was not a complete remedy. He was injured by violence,
perhaps; he was deprived of his property during a certain
period, and the property was usually injured. There was some-
thing appealing in the extent to which self-help was permitted,
in the extent to which the plaintiff within five days might
gather his friends and forcibly eject the intruder, a feature
apparently peculiar to this assize. As has been observed, this
action resisted for centuries the encroachments of trespass in
which respect it fared better than the assize of nuisance.
The assize of nuisance from its inception dealt with a class
of wrongs that inevitably must have been recognized later as
trespasses, and there seems little reasop for one absorbing the
other beyond the infinitely vaster connotation of trespass. Its
justice was no speedier, in fact it was not so speedy as the
relief afforded by the assize of novel disseisin. Many of the
wrongs against which the assize of nuisance was directed were
offences to which the cant phrase of equity, "irreparable injury,"
Was aptly applied, so that such of its jurisdiction as was not
absorbed by trespass fell into the capacious maw of equity.
From the beginning, the assize of nuisance follows a fairly
consistent line of development, and the cases disclose a certain
uniformity of relief. The court orders the restoration of the
status quo, and such further relief as the situation calls for.
P. 30, Edward I, Placitorun Abbreviatio, 245.
P. i8, Edward I, Placitorum Abbreviatio, 282.
Tempore .ohannis, Placitorum Abbreviatio, 70.
Tempore Johannis, Placitorum Abbreviatio, 51.
"P. 7 and 8 John, Placitorum Abbreviatio, 51; M. 8 John, Ibid., 53;
Ibid., 68, 77, 81. 44 Hen. III, Ibid., 146.
" T. i4 John, Placitorum Abbreviatio, 87.
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Thus, an assize of nuisance is brought against eight defendants
because they unjustly and without legal right erected a certain
wall in the free and common pasture of Foxcote, to the plaintiff's
injury, etc. The jury say that the defendants erected the wall
as alleged. Judgment that the wall be taken down, and all
those who erected it, be in mercy.3
5
The remedy is complete, as judgment may be given not only
for the removal of a wrongful structure but for damages as
well.3 6 If the assize is brought for the wrongful diversion of a
water course, the judgment of the court is that the water be
restored to its former course.
3 7 The instances of the action are
uniform in nature, for example, conducting a fair wrongfully,
8
erecting a fence,39 obstructing a road,
40 breaking a ditch. 1
In all of these cases the issue is presented to the jury-
"Did the defendant unjustly, etc., obstruct the road," and
if the jury answer "Quod abbas obstruzit viam illamn" the
court orders the abbot to open the road. Both of the assizes
began with the same formula. The writ was either "Si . . .
injuste disseisavit" or "Si . . . injusie obstruxit." But the
uniformity of litigation under the assize of nuisance is much
more striking than in the case of novel disseisin. The connota-
tion of nuisance was more limited even than that of novel
disseisin.
The proceedings were the same in both assizes. The contrast
between the two is instructive. The assize of novel disseisin is
a remedy against the wrongful dispossession of the owner from
his freehold. The assize of nuisance gives to trespass its basic
principle of widest application, viz., sic tuo utere ut alienam non
laedas, for the wrong to be redressed was the improper use
of one's own property, the building of a house to the nuisance
of a neighbor's freehold and the like.
For almost a century, between 1194 A. D. and 1285 A. D.,
these assizes held the field almost undisturbed against the action
of trespass. It was not a very popular remedy until the reign of
Henry III, and the cases are not numerous until much later.
The words of the complaint generally follow the same formula,
that the defendants "contra pacem domini Regis %4 et armis
intruserunt," etc., and the relief awarded is usually damages.
2
"Tempore Regis Ricardi Primi, Placitorurn Abbreviatio, xo.
"Assize 25 Hen. III, Placitorum Abbreviatio, 3I5.
25 Hen. III, Placitbrum Abbreviatio, 12o, i21; H. 12 E. I, Ibid., 2o5.
UT. 14 John, Placitorum Abbreviatio, 85.
zo Hen. III, Placitorum Abbreviatio, IO3.
'8 Hen. III, Placitorum Abbreviatio, 1o.
'3 John, Placitorum Abbreviatio, 33.
'Easter, 4 Hen. III, Bracton's N. B. pl 85.
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The action of trespass naturally could not follow a consistent
line of development by contrast with another form of action
based upon a wrong diametrically opposite in principle. The
clearer definition of trespass began when the principles of con-
tract came to be understood. But that is a matter that had not
yet been settled as late as 1388 A. D. in the reign of Richard II,
if we may believe a dictum of Thirning, J., for he says that
the issue of contract or not contract must be tried by the
bishop."
Trespass, therefore, was defined at first only by contrast with
other forms of tort or trespass, and possibly with debt. Words
of force appear in the action of debt until a comparatively late
period. For example, in an action of debt, the complaint is
"injuste detinet" and the defendant in reply denies the tort
and the force."
It is clear that no distinction can be made between trespass
and any other form of action on the ground that trespass is
more noxal or more highly penal than any other. The action
is a civil action, and it is enforced precisely as are all of the
other civil actions.
Trespass is not exclusively an action for damages as yet.
In fact, it is doubtful if there was any action for damages as
such until recourse to the action on the case. became frequent.
But the cases in which damages are not awarded are compara-
tively few. If a man bring an action for the killing of his
horse, or because of an assault, obviously in a civil action, he
is seeking damages.
Trespass offers a much more coherent picture than any of
the allied actions prior to the Statute of Westminster II. As
in all other actions the law requires the plaintiff to be named
in the writ.45
The necessity of limiting an action having so broad a sig-
nificance as trespass became apparent from the first. It was
settled early that a matter of title or of right to possession
could not be determined in an action of trespass. For example,
the defendants were attached for entering the plaintiff's turbary,
cutting turf, and illtreating his servants. The defendants replied
that the turbary belonged to them and not to the plaintiff. It
was held that since both parties claimed the seisin of the same
tenements and this cannot be determined by the writ of trespass,
but a writ of novel disseisin lies well in such a case, and like-
SM. 12 R. II, Fitzherbert, Garde, xo6. (This case is not very fully
reported by Fitzherbert.)
"IM. 12 P. II, Fitzherbert, Jurisdiction, 8.
1 P. Edward I, Placitorum Abbreviatio, 272.
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wise both damages and the tenements can be recovered in novel
disseisin, the writ in this case does not lie.48
A similar conclusion is reached in an action for cutting trees
in which the defendant alleged that the trees were growing
on his own land and not on the land of the plaintiff. The defend-
ant says, "supra feodum et liberum tenementum suum" whence
the conclusion of the court "liberum tenementum non potest per
hoc breve de transgressione terminari."'7
Thus early was it determined that trespass did not lie to try
the right to a freehold, nor to inquire concerning the title to
a freehold. In both of these cases the court advises the
plaintiff that he may, if he wish, purchase a writ of novel
disseisin.
There are some few cases that bring us close to the action
on the case. In IS Henry III, the defendant is summoned to
answer "quare vi et injuste" he uses a certain road and holds
it beyond his land of Waleton, which he ought not to have,
as it is said, and- whence the complaint is that by this use, a
plaintiff is injured and claims forty shillings damages. This
question is left to the jury, as well as the question of title to
the road.
48
Evidently the law had no objection to trying the title to, a
road in trespass, although it refused to try the title to a freehold.
Undoubtedly there is some confusion in the conception of the
legal basis of redress. In an action for taking fishing nets and
boats, it is alleged that the plaintiff was thus hindered from
exercising his right of piscary. The judgment is that the nets
must be returned, but there is no mention of damages.49
The invasion of the plaintiff's liberty at Shornes, the breaking
of his prison, and the removal and hanging Of one of his
prisoners by guards of the hundred of Shamel is the basis of
an action as late as 17 Henry III. And the defense is that
the hundred of Shamel has the right of infangenthef (taking
of thieves) and utfangenthef (execution of thieves).50
The remaining cases of the period under discussion add little
to the general principles derived from the cases thus far con-
sidered. The mere fact that trespass is brought for the taking
of cattle is of little significance, nor is it instructive to know
that the defendant pleads that the plaintiff is his villein.
51
SH. 38 Hen. III, Placitorum, 142.
'TM. I. Edward I, Placitorum A bbreviatio, 26z.
18 Hen. III, Bracton's N. B. pL 843.
T. 15 Hen. III, Bracton's N. B. pl. 66.
'M. I7 Hen. III, Bracton's N. B. pl. 821.
"44 Hen. III, Placitorum Abbreviatio, r47.
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The actions follow a more or less uniform type, for example,
trespass for false imprisonment;52 for breaking a ditch;53 for
removing fishing poles;"4 for removing grass; 55 for taking
wreckage; 58 for entering a liberty and burying a man without
view;57 invasion of a warren;58 for assault;" for assault and
beating;6° for killing a horse."'
It would be an anomaly -to find damages awarded in novel
disseisin and nuisance and not in trespass. Damages were
necessarily the basis of complaint in certain instances and where
the wrong is the taking or killing of beasts; trespass is chosen
as a remedy in order to obtain ihe valuo of the property taken
or destroyed.
Thus, in 3 Edward I, Thomas Hegham sues Thomas de Ley-
burne and two others for taking and carrying away his cattle
to the value of forty marks. The jury fixed the damages at
nineteen marks. Afterward the court, being of opinion that
the inquisition had not been carefully taken, issued a precept
to the sheriff to summon the jury to inquire if the cattle of
the plaintiff had been taken by precept of the said Thomas de
Leyburne, and whether the plaintiff could have replevied them
if he had desired. It was said that he could; the court held
that the plaintiff had lost the cattle through his own negligence
•(quod ipse Thomas Hegham amisit averia sua negligencia sua
propria) and that he should return the damages that had been
paid to him. 2 In 9 Edward I, the abbot of Cern recovers ten
pounds damages against the defendant for taking wreckage
within his manor.68
Recalling now that trespass as a popular action is but in its
infancy even in the reign of Edward I, let us observe that the
action served two purposes. It served as a highly effective
method of compelling restitution of property taken by force
and it served equally well for the recovery of damages, where
15 Hen. III, Bracton's N. B. case 465. H. 9 Hen. III, Bracton's N. B.
case 1o41.
x5 Hen. III, Bracton's N. B. case 507.
H. i8 Hen. III, Bracton's N. B. case 835.
ig Hen. III, Bracton's N. B. case 1121; 1o Hen. III, Ibid., case 1735.
'M. 9 Edward I, Abbreviatio Placitorum, 2o.
Tempore Johanni,, Abbreviatio Placitorum, 70.
"H. 38 Hen. III, Abbreviatio Placitorum, 41; T. 4 Edw. I, Ibid., igo;
M. -4 Edward I, Ibid., 191; M. 9 Edward I, Ibid., 201; H. io Edw. I,
Ibid., 2o2.
M"I. 38 Hen. III, Ibid., 134.
T. io Edward I, Ibid., 274.
T. io Edward I, Ibid., 274.
"Placitorum Abbreviatio, 265.
'Placitorum Abbreviatio, 20..
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the object taken could not be restored. It is equally certain that
where the goods were taken under color of right and the appro-
priate remedy was replevin that trespass could not succeed. The
writ did not always contain words indicating violence. In many
cases the plaintiff merely complains and sets forth his damages.
In others the formule, now second nature to the lawyer in a
suit for trespass, are employed.
In almost all of the cases, some one, plaintiff or defendant,
is amerced (in misericordia) but this is a matter entirely dif-
ferent from the damages (damna). The amercement is the
king's indirect way of adding to his revenue. Surely it is a
harsh decision in the cases of trespass considered above, that
the plaintiff has sued in trespass, has miscontrued his Uir, may
sue in novel disseisin, but must make fine to the king, "pro
falso clamore." The amercement, the penalty to the king, is
the inevitable tax on litigation from which no one escapes,
whether he sue in trespass, or even for breach of covenant.
This may be verified by glancing at random through the cases
in the .Placitorum Abbreviatio. The penalty to the king had
no relation to trespass, nor can any conclusion as to the penal
nature of trespass be drawn from the fact that the penalty is
imposed, It is imposed on any unsuccessful plaintiff "pro falso
clamore,"-for having failed to make good his complaint.
6"
There is very little of a criminal nature in this action of tres-
pass. The action is maintained without words of violence and
with them, and amercement was likely to take place in an action
brought by a simple complaint for taking wreckage, and to
be omitted in a case filled with the rumblings of vi et armis,
armed men, and destruction of manors. Trespass is administered
as a civil remedy, and the vi et armis sometimes had significance
and sometimes had not, much as is the case to-day.
The same assertion may be made as to damages. Trespass
was sometimes brought for a specific sum stated in the com-
plaint; sometimes to compel restitution of property, but it
was not confined to either. Later, we shall find the courts
refusing to give both property and damages, but that is another
matter. As we have seen, the courts exercised a considerable
power of controlling verdicts and this, too, grows to incredible
bounds, the judges not only reducing verdicts but increasing
them because they 'believe them insufficient6
5
Again, outlawry has been suggested as one feature of trespass
that made it unusually drastic in its operation, and therefore
"Bracton's N. B. pl. 2o8, 242.
" See note 63, supra.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
a more popular remedy. But outlawry was a part of the entire
common law. If a defendant persistently remained away from
court after repeated summons, even in the action of debt,
judgment was given against him by default, he was outlawed
and his goods forfeited. His remedy then was to purchase a
charter of pardon, and sue a scire facias against the plaintiff,
in order to do what he should have done in the first place, viz.,
defend the action.
Apparently, then, the only virtue of the action of trespass
was its extremely general or miscellaneous nature or its wider
connotation. Why then its later popularity, and abnormal
development?
The answer to this, apparently, is obvious, if the common
law be considered from beginning to end. As has been observed,
the earlier remedies were invented for instances, not for series
of event. The actions of ael, .bisael and cosinage are familiar
examples. If you claimed of the seisin of your grandfather,
you brought a writ of ael; if of the seisin of your great-grand-
father, a writ of bisael; and if of some other relative, a writ
of cosinage. Why should not all real actions to recover pos-
session of land, or to vindicate the title to land, have been com-
prehended in an action of ejectment, or any of its synonyms?
Simply because the law had not yet realized the similarity
or identity of principle common to each. This, we believe, is
the key to the development of the forms of action. From some
hundred of different actions, existing at the time of Edward I,
the common law has gradually selected two, contract and tort,
which represent voluntary and involuntary action; consequences
voluntarily assumed, and consequences thrust upon one. This
is the only plausible reason for development of the action of
trespass, the sole reason why trespass comprises so large a
proportion of all modern litigation. It was the only action
capable of holding all wrongs, of whatever description, just
as assumpsit is the only action capable of embracing every
manner of undertaking.
Nothing in the earlier cases of deceit could have warranted
the supposition that they were trespasses; trespass was under-
stood then. They are actions brought for false recoveries
against plaintiffs., either by omitting to summon them, or by
presenting fictitious affidavits, through fraud in the inquisition
and the like.e6
In the action brought to enforce the warranty in a fine, how-
ever, there is a reasonable approach to the modem action of
T. 2 Henry III, Br. N. B. pl. 1o5. See also, Ibid., pl. io7; pL 168;
pL 2o8; pl. 296; pl. 500; p1. 645; pl. "i73; pl. ii84 ; pl. 1629; pl. 1747;
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deceit. It is unnecessary to observe, perhaps, that the fine is
equivalent to a modem conveyance of record; with this differ-
ence, that the officers witnessing the transaction, instead of
being notaries public, or some other official authorized to take
acknowledgments, are judges of the court. In 1225 A. D.,
9 Henry III, Br. N. B. P1. i69o, one Thomas, son of Ganfridus,
was attached to reply to the widow Geve (Genevieve?) because
of his failure to comply with a fine made at Westminster before
the justices between Ganfridus, father of Thomas, whose heir
he is, and Geve, for six shillings of rent, which Thomas refused
to pay, because, says the plaintiff, her husband, Swanus, sold to
Thomas her part of the chirograph (the deed or fine of the
conveyance is tripartite-there are three originals written on
one sheet of parchment, and when they are separated the cutting
is made along a jagged line, the original or foot remaining
with the court, and the other two copies going one to each
party). The court having examined the foot of the fine, found
that Ganfridus, father of the defendant and his heirs, held one
messuage with the appurtenances in Coventry of Geva during her
life, at a rental of six shillings. It was held that Geva should
recover her seisin and that Thomas be in the mercy, he having
defended the fine and the chirograph, and having falsely called
a third person to the warranty.67
In this brief survey of the progress of trespass during six
or seven hundred years, one fact surely is patent There is
no elemental fact or series of facts upon which redress is based.
Possibly there is a theoretical breach of the king's peace in all
trespasses, but that is merely a formality. Probably one who
takes his neighbor's cattle knows what he is doing, and to that
extent his trespass is an intentional wrong. But the cases
discuss wrongs, and not whether they are intentional or not.
In one instance they say the plaintiff has lost his cattle through
his own negligence, indirectly acquitting the defendant of cul-
pability. And since there are few or no indirect trespasses, it
is fair to assume that trespass was aimed at intentional wrong,
but this is no more a theory of trespass than of novel disseisin
or of nuisance. It is true that these were really torts, but the
law had not yet mentally connected them. As the cases show,
the court will not grant relief in trespass that should have been
sought in novel disseisin.
There is no suggestion in any of the cases as yet, of any
approach to a legal standard of conduct. That is a product
pl. i924. See also, 5 Henry III, Br. N. B. pl. r94 (This is really a civil
action for conspiracy, hardly a deceit.)
" Note the use of seisin. It is a right, not possession. The plaintiff
really vindicates her right to collect six shillings of rent-her seisi.
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of a later day. The standard is purely objective. The law is
made cognizant that a wrong has been committed-or since this
is a prejudicial statement-becomes aware of an injury-it seeks
the actor-the person actively contributing to the injury-it
compels him to pay the sum ascertained as damages.
In scope, in range of actionable wrongs, trespass is wide
enough. If your ownership of the thing injured is not denied,
trespass affords a remedy. But it is not as yet an action for
damages as such. The development of the action for damages
and the rise of the action on the case belong to the succeeding
period.
